Race to the Bottom  Returns: China\u27s Challenge to the International Labor Movement by Diamond, Stephen F.
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2003
"Race to the Bottom" Returns: China's Challenge to
the International Labor Movement
Stephen F. Diamond
Santa Clara University School of Law, sdiamond@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
10 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 39 (2003-2004)
HeinOnline -- 10 U. C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 39 2003-2004
THE "RACE TO THE BOTTOM" RETURNS: CHINA'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR MOVEMENT 
Stephen F. Diamond* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
II. CHINA'S ECONOMY AT A TURNING POINT.............. 48 
III. CHINESE TRADE UNIONISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARENA................... 65 
V. GLOBAL LABOR's ApPROACH TO CHINA................ 68 
I. INTRODUcrION 
In the early morning of March 3, 2003, two young women, Yao Dan 
and Xiao Yu, were sitting in a Beijing hotel room when 20 officers of the 
Chinese Public Security Bureau burst in and detained them. Their 
crime? They were in Beijing to attempt to meet with the defense lawyer 
representing Xiao Yu's father, Xiao Yunliang. Xiao Yunliang had been 
tried several weeks earlier along with Yao Dan's father, Yao Fuxin, for 
allegedly "subverting the political power of the [Chinese] state." Both 
men were arrested in connection with their participation in a labor 
protest that had occurred a year earlier in the industrial town of 
Liaoyang in northeast China.' But that was not the reason given to the 
women for their detention, according to the independent and widely 
respected China Labour Bulletin of Hong Kong.2 They were told, 
absurdly, that the hotel they were staying in was "too shabby," and that 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; Visiting 
Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, 2003-2004; J.D., Yale, 1994; Ph.D., 
London, 1991; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1977. The author wishes to 
acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by Marilee Chan in the 
preparation of this article. 
1 Criminal Verdict: Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang (Intermediate People's Court 
of Liaoyang Municipality, Liaoning Province, May 9, 2003) translated in The Liaoyang 
Workers' Struggle: Portrait of a Movement, CHINA LAB. BULL., July 2003, at 71, 
available at http://www.china-labour.org.hk (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Liaoyang Workers' Struggle). 
2 Descriptions of these events are found in Press Release, Human Rights in 
China, Liaoyang Labor Activists' Daughters Detained (Mar. 3, 2003) and Liaoyang 
Workers' Struggle, supra note 1, at 26. 
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they would be taken to another hotel and allowed to meet with Xiao's 
lawyer. Instead they were taken to yet another location in the city where 
they were held while their possessions were searched. They were then 
driven back to Liaoyang in a police van accompanied by eight police 
officers, held separately in a government office and questioned for 
several hours. Before their release, the police requested they sign a 
doctored transcript of the interrogation including a statement that the 
purpose of their visit to Beijing had been, "to talk to foreign news 
media." Three months later the Intermediate People's Court of 
Liaoyang Municipality duly announced that the fathers of both women 
had been convicted of their "crime" and sentenced Yao to seven years, 
and Xiao to four years, in prison with an additional two-year period for 
each in which their "political rights" are to be suspended.3 
As it turned out, the women were probably mostly guilty of bad 
timing. Their visit to Beijing happened to come just before the opening 
of the Chinese National People's Congress and the National People's 
Political Consultative Conference that were both engaged in sensitive 
discussions and negotiations about the transfer of power to a new 
generation of Chinese leaders.4 But why would that cause the police to 
be so concerned about the attempt of these women to meet with the 
lawyer representing one of their fathers? Was Beijing attempting to send 
a signal about the right of counsel in the new China? No. It appears far 
more likely that this event signals the fear and sense of fragility that grips 
the Chinese leadership. The fathers of these two women had been active 
in one of the most important worker protests among many thousands of 
such protests that have swept through China in the last few years. When 
originally arrested the two men were threatened with the death penalty. 
Only an international campaign of solidarity and further protest by 
fellow workers succeeded in getting the Chinese regime to reduce the 
sentence. The convictions of these worker activists for engaging in what 
much of the rest of the world would consider mild social protest, together 
with the harassment of their families for attempting to engage legal 
counsel, highlight the true state of labor relations and of the law in 
modern China. 
Unfortunately this is no longer a phenomenon that can be viewed 
from a distance. China is now, and increasingly, an integral player in the 
global economy and in international relations. The detention and 
harassment of Yao Dan and Xiao Yu indicate what is at stake: economic 
and political restructuring in China today is affecting the lives of millions, 
yet only a small number of top bureaucrats and wealthy regime-backed 
entrepreneurs are making the basic decisions about the outcome of this 
3 Liaoyang Workers' Struggle, supra note 1, at 71. 
4 Human Rights in China, supra note 2. 
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process. This bureaucratic and entrepreneurial class resists fiercely any 
serious attempt to build independent and democratic institutions such as 
trade unions. If this means exposing the regime as hypocritical about its 
commitment to the rule of law in China, they seem willing to take the 
political heat. 
The globalization process that has done so much to integrate the 
Chinese economy into the world economy has only encouraged the 
regime. Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, European and American 
corporations are fighting tooth and nail to take advantage of the changes 
underway in China. They see China as offering the world a vast pool of 
relatively cheap labor that comes not a moment too soon as declining 
profitability has hit returns to investors in the advanced economies. 
According to official government statistics, China's urban population has 
more than quadrupled since the early 1950s, whereas its rural population 
has only increased from 503 to 866 million.s This massive population 
shift is contributing to a significant unemployment problem. And that, in 
turn, is the cause of widespread social unrest. The Chinese Communist 
regime views this unrest as subversive of their entrenched power. Thus, 
rather than being concerned that the violation of universally recognized 
civil liberties such as the right of access to legal counsel and the freedom 
of association is the source of increased tension with the outside world, 
the regime views these violations as the solution to a significant problem 
facing the global economy. The international labor movement has 
struggled for more than a century to establish basic human rights, 
including labor rights, as an inviolable floor beneath which the world 
could not sink. Unless the labor movement and the world community as 
a whole confronts China directly with an alternative path of economic 
and political development, the integration of China into the global 
economy puts that century-long achievement at great risk. 
The emerging Chinese model-a "socialist market economy" 
according to the regime itself-represents a new stage in the evolution of 
post Cold War global capitalism. The core principle of this model is the 
so-called "race to the bottom" where global multinational corporations 
ally with repressive developing country governments to combine high 
productivity manufacturing and services with cheap labor at the expense 
of unionized workers in developed economies. Free market advocates 
typically attempt to reduce the idea of a "race to the bottom" in global 
labor conditions to a caricature. If there really were a race to the 
bottom, they ask, then why are there so few multinationals operating in 
central Africa or countries like Haiti, where wages are indeed the lowest 
in the world? It is certainly true that capital is reluctant to invest in 
5 1998 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (China Stat. Info. & Consultancy Service 
Centre) at 105. 
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countries like Haiti or Rwanda, though such countries have long been 
the source of vital natural resources and agricultural products for global 
multinationals. It is also true that an examination of cross-border trade 
and investment flows demonstrates that the vast majority of such flows 
are between developed economies, not between the developed and 
developing world.6 
But that misstates the problem. The "race to the bottom" defines a 
different and new issue: the ability of sophisticated multinational 
corporate capital to combine high-productivity technology with labor 
that is paid substantially less than that found in the developed world. 
Developing this dynamic is not as simple as finding the worst-paid and 
most-repressed workers in the world. What one. finds, in fact, in 
countries like Haiti or Rwanda are not workers in the classic sense-
ready and available to be part of the disciplined structure of a modern 
capitalist firm. In large part the populations of those countries are at a 
near-feudal level of development, with the "workforce" resembling 
peasants, not modern workers. The difference in China or Mexico or 
Indonesia is that decades of rule there by modernizing authoritarian 
states has produced a new kind of workforce that is akin to that found in 
Europe or the United States, but at a wage level far below that of the 
advanced economies and without the independent political power that 
characterizes countries with strong labor movements. 
The "race to the bottom" is, in fact, what Harley Shaiken calls "high 
productivity poverty.'" This "isn't the poverty of Haiti or Bangladesh," 
Shaiken argues, "where industry is antiquated and the societies and 
people are poor .... The problem isn't developing countries attracting 
advanced manufacturing, but rather that wages aren't simply low; they 
are artificially depressed. The law or the club-or both-are used to 
prevent workers from sharing the gains .... [T]he historic link between 
workers producing more and earning more is tragically reversed-
workers produce more and earn less."s Financial analyst Richard 
Duncan confirms this trend: 
Almost any labor-intensive product that can be made in the 
United States, Western Europe or Japan can be made at 
considerably less cost in China or a dozen other low-wage 
nations. Impediments once thrown up by transportation 
problems or capital shortages have long since been overcome 
by technological developments and the removal of capital 
6 See PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE (1996). 
7 Nancy Montwieier, 'High Productivity Poverty' Threatens Workers Labor, 
Professor Warns Machinists Meeting, DAILY LAB. REp., Sep. 13,2000, at C-l. 
8 [d. See also, HARLEY SHAIKEN, MEXICO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY AND WORK ORGANIZATION IN EXPORT INDUSTRIES (1990). 
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controls. Today, the most capital-intensive manufacturing 
processes can be financed and built in any number of 
developing countries, so that the most advanced facilities can 
be combined with the lowest-cost labor.9 
43 
This break in the link between productivity and wages is the key to 
understanding the phenomenon known widely as the "race to the 
bottom." The creation of that link was the result of decades of effort by 
the international trade union movement. In the late 1920s and 1930s it 
led economists to speak of a new development: wage rigidity. This was 
the reflection in economic theory of the power of trade unions in a 
business downturn. It led John Maynard Keynes to conclude that the 
normal process of wages falling to a market-clearing price, often referred 
to as "Say's Law" as Keynes understood it, no longer functioned.lO 
But today China's entrance into the world economy represents the 
attempted integration of nearly a billion new workers into the global 
labor market at wages far below those found in the advanced economies. 
This signals the return of a world that operates according to Say's Law 
because the constraints on free markets, such as "wage rigidity" and the 
union power reflected in an effective international labor rights regime, 
may dissolve. As one leading Wall Street economist told his clients: 
China's labor force is bigger than that in all of the OECD 
countries combined. Its rapid development has caused 
dramatic shifts in relative factor prices in a short period of 
9 RICHARD DUNCAN, THE DOLLAR CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CURES 144 
(2003). 
10 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST 
AND MONEY 26 (1964). There is enormous controversy within the field of economic 
history on the actual definition of Say's Law and on Keynes' interpretation of it. In 
fact, the Law itself is better understood as the "law of markets"-which holds that 
where there is no "interference" with the markets they will find an equilibrium 
whereby all output can be sold. Only what W.H. Hutt called "defects in pricing" can 
interfere with the exchange of all output for other goods and services. W.H. HUlT, A 
REHABILITATION OF SAY'S LAW 8 (1974). But there is very little controversy about 
what Keynes meant on a substantive level, that the power of the labor movement 
constrained the ability of the private sector and the government to use wage cutting as 
a means of jumpstarting economic growth in a depression. "To suppose that a flexible 
wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on the whole is one of 
laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth. It is only in a highly authoritarian society, 
where sudden, substantial, all-round changes could be decreed that a flexible wage-
policy could function with success. One can imagine it in operation in Italy, Germany 
or Russia, but not in France, the United States or Great Britain." KEYNES at 269. 
Recall, of course, that this was when fascism or Stalinism ruled the first set of states, 
while democracy continued to function in the latter set. Hutt expressed the more 
traditional laissez-faire view that the power of unions was a key "defect in pricing" 
rather than the inevitable byproduct of modern capitalism. HUlT at 134-144. On Say 
generally, see EVELYN L. FORGET, THE SOCIAL ECONOMICS OF JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY: 
MARKETS AND VIRTUE (1999). 
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time. Some of the changes will be permanent even with 
China's maturity. The most important one is that the value of 
labor will be permanently devalued against scarce resources. 
This is likely to have far-reaching consequences to the 
distribution of income in the world. The speed comes from 
the fact that the labor productivity gap between China and 
the mature economies is far less than the wealth gap between 
them. . . . China's reintegration into the global economy, 
therefore, presents a major discontinuity. The gaps between 
China and developed economies for productivity and for 
wealth are expressing themselves through rapid capital 
reallocation from mature economies to China and the 
consequent rapid growth of China's exports. The key driver 
is China's low wages resulting from its vast surplus labor and 
low level of wealth. l1 
Far from being an anomaly, then, the arrest and conviction of 
Chinese labor activists, the harassment of their families for attempting to 
meet with legal counsel, and the violent suppression of democratic 
institutions such as free trade unions and independent political parties, 
represent a stark, if not dark, future for the global system. In fact, the 
effort to move the world in this direction has been given significant 
support by attempts to change the basic structure and purpose of central 
international institutions such as the International Labor Organization 
("ILO") and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Such a 
conclusion runs counter to the arguments made about the nature of 
political and economic reform in China today. For the most part, 
supporters of the Chinese restructuring process argue that the market 
reforms underway there today will naturally create an opening for 
political pluralism and, eventually, a genuine rule of law and 
democratization.12 This viewpoint is reflected inside the international 
labor movement itself by those who argue that the trade union 
movement should begin a process of "constructive engagement" with the 
government-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
("ACFfU,,).13 The view held by some westerners that China will evolve 
towards democracy simply because it undertakes market reforms and the 
subset of this view held by some within the western labor movement that 
China's state-controlled labor organization, the ACFTU, will begin to, or 
11 Andy Xie, Asia Pacific: The Chinese Decade, MORGAN STANLEY GLOBAL 
ECON. F., Feb. 10, 2003. 
12 Henry M. Paulson, Jr., More Than the Bloom of One I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
15, 2000, at 17. 
13 Kent Wong & Elaine Bernard, Labor's Mistaken Anti-China Campaign, NEW 
LAB. F. (FalllWinter 2000) ("Labor needs to encourage critical engagement with 
China .... [L]abor leaders should take a bold step and seek to open up dialogue and 
cultivate relationships with workers and trade unions [sic] in China."). 
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already does, behave like a genuine trade union and thus helps reinforce 
the alleged evolution towards democracy, is viewed as naive by longtime 
specialists in Chinese politics and labor issues. 14 Such views may, in fact, 
reflect changing attitudes towards democracy and labor rights in the 
West as much as they do a genuine assessment of the current situation in 
China. 
This article will take its lead from the actions of the Chinese regime 
itself. The regime's fear that the mere presence of two young women in 
Beijing trying to meet with a lawyer representing their labor activist 
fathers suggests that there are two major issues of concern to the Chinese 
regime: law and labor. Thus, at the level of law, the focus will be on the 
changes that have taken place in the WTO and the ILO that are 
reinforcing the emerging Chinese model. China entered the WTO after 
a bitter political battle between the American trade union movement, on 
the one hand, and nearly the entire U.S. political and business 
establishment, on the other. But this could only be accomplished by the 
codification of a certain new approach to international labor rights in 
both the WTO and the ILO. This article will argue that this new 
approach has actually created a legal pathology that only postpones 
resolution of the real problems associated with the Chinese model. It is 
an unstable compromise that conflicts with other principles at work in 
the international legal environment. ls 
These international legal developments are being met domestically 
within China by an attempt to impose a new regime on the Chinese 
working class. This new regime relies on the same heavy-handed 
authoritarian measures that have long been constituent elements of 
modern Chinese politics. In the past the Chinese Communists justified 
such measures by the alleged need to resist the encroachment of 
capitalism, while now the Party defends the same authoritarian approach 
14 Minxin Pei, Don't hold your breath for openness in China, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 
2003 at 15 (discussing "sclerotic authoritarian regime syndrome" that afflicts Chinese 
leaders); ACFTU-ICFTU: A Modern Love Story in the Making?, 52 CHINA LAB. 
BULL., Jan.-Feb. 2000, available at http://www.china-Iabour.org.hk (last visited Aug. 4, 
2003; on file with author) (noting that "aspirations of the international trade union 
movement and the international work of the ACFTU stand contrary to each other"). 
15 E.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pt. III, 
art. 8(1)(a), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N.GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976) recognizes the right of individuals "to form trade unions and join the trade 
union of his choice ... [and] the right to strike" [hereinafter ICESCR]. See Aaron N. 
Lehl, China's Trade Union System Under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Is China in Compliance with Article 8?, 21 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 203, 226 (1999). The ICESCR is, in some ways, stronger than the ILO 
Declaration as it not only incorporates the crucial principle of freedom of choice of 
labor organizations but also recognizes the right to strike. 
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as necessary to succeed in the capitalist world. These developments feed 
each other. As accommodations are made to undemocratic approaches 
to human rights in international institutions, those elements in countries 
like China that see a shortcut to wealth and power through 
authoritarianism are encouraged to continue to suppress democratic 
movements. In addition, there is an unhealthy feedback into the 
advanced economies as the "race to the bottom" undermines the ability 
of those economies to provide better wages, hours and working 
conditions in industries that compete with Chinese authoritarianism. 
Thus, the international labor movement may have the most to lose 
among an array of democratic institutions. Even commentators reluctant 
to embrace the idea of a "race to the bottom" in the global market pause 
when they consider the overwhelming impact of China.16 An example 
from just one industrial sector-textile, clothing and footwear-
illustrates the problem. While throughout the 1990s the number of 
people working in this industry remained stable at 30 million, Cynthia 
Williams has noted, "there has been a dramatic shift in the distribution of 
those jobs towards Asia," with that region now accounting for 72 percent 
of world employment in the sector and China alone 20 percent. 
Meanwhile, employment in Europe and the United States in that sector 
"fell steadily throughout 1990-1998." Williams refers to an ILO study 
that notes that the average hourly wage rate in the industry ranges from 
a high of $10 an hour in Europe to a low of $0.45 an hour in China.17 
But if labor loses so does democracy. The trade union is a central 
force for democratization, transparency and social responsibility in a 
modern industrial economy. Without the ability to form effective trade 
unions, workers cannot be said to enjoy fundamental human rights such 
as the freedom of association or the freedom of speech or the right to 
have grievances heard and redressed. Without an effective labor 
movement there is no counterweight to the power of business interests or 
volatile market forces in society or to the state itself. The power of the 
market to force new forms of brutal competition can easily take hold, 
generating deep political conflict and social unrest. Equally possible is 
the emergence of a Leviathan state that suppresses human freedom. In 
16 William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for 
International Labor Standards, SO NEB. L. REV. 715 (2001) ("there is no evidence of a 
'race to the bottom' internationally in the labor arena" but "there are substantial 
arguments for international regulation" because "the outlier countries coupled with 
China make it possible that the 'race to the bottom' phenomenon could yet become a 
pressing one"). 
17 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalization, 35 V.c. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 731 (2002), citing Press Release, ILO, 
Global Employment Levels in Textile, Clothing and Footwear Industries Holding 
Stable as Industries Relocate (Oct. 16, 2000), available at http://www.ilo.orglpublic/ 
englishlbureau/inflprI2000/3S.htm. 
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fact, as this article should demonstrate, this is precisely why exploring the 
process of economic reform in China is so important. The economic 
changes underway there are creating huge new inequities and 
imbalances. This is now leaking into the international arena as China's 
cheap labor export-led model of growth has generated a massive trade 
imbalance between China and the United States. As the presidential 
elections approach this is becoming an increasingly important problem in 
domestic U.S. politics. Thus, this article will argue, there is a need to 
articulate an alternative model that restores the role of democratic 
institutions as a counterweight to Say's "law of markets." 
To explore these issues, this article will consider four areas of 
concern. First, the structural changes underway in the Chinese economy 
are creating both domestic and international imbalances that exacerbate 
inequalities among Chinese workers and create new inequities in the 
global labor market. Second, the Chinese regime's approach to labor 
rights remains rigidly authoritarian and, as a result, it is triggering ever 
more dramatic confrontations between workers and the Chinese state, 
despite the regime's nominal commitment to "socialism." Third, these 
developments are being reinforced by a pathological evolution in the 
principles that govern key international institutions such as the WTO and 
the ILO. A conflict has emerged within the international legal arena 
between the founding principles of these institutions and their current 
approach to labor and human rights issues. Fourth, within the 
international labor movement itself a small current is emerging which 
views an accommodation with the Chinese regime as a feasible 
alternative to the long-standing support of the international labor 
movement for independent and free trade unionism in China. This 
approach threatens the credibility of the labor movement's opposition to 
the most damaging aspects of the globalization process, a major 
commitment of organized labor at least since the "Battle of Seattle" that 
took place at the failed ministerial conference of the WTO in November 
1999.18 
These four developments militate in favor of the need to reassert 
core principles of labor solidarity but these must not just be mindlessly 
repeated. These developments signal a new form of global capitalism 
that increasingly sees authoritarianism as having a natural role in a 
modern economy. The unquestioned acceptance of the outcomes of the 
"law of markets," no matter how volatile, uneven, or unjust, now appears 
to be the norm as social movements and democratic institutions are 
rendered a nearly mute Greek chorus. Thus critics must take into 
18 See Stephen F. Diamond, Bridging the Divide: An Alternative Approach to 
International Labor Rights After the Battle of Seattle, 29 PEpP. L. REV. 115, 117 (2001 
[hereinafter Bridging the Divide]. 
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account the new forms of capitalism and the power of its norms as it 
devises alternatives. Restoring the validity of questioning outcomes and 
thus of the value of social input and control of those outcomes must lie at 
the heart of these alternatives. This means that support, for example, for 
labor rights in China must go beyond the typical anti-Stalinist rhetoric 
that labor has used in the past. While the Chinese regime may fear the 
emergence of a Polish Solidarity-style movement, the labor movement 
must also learn from the mistakes and limits of the Solidarity experience. 
II. CHINA'S ECONOMY AT A TURNING POINT 
It is hard to overstate the magnitude of the changes underway in 
China today. While still only accounting for 5 percent of global 
manufactured exports in 2002, according to Morgan Stanley chief 
economist Stephen Roach, China nonetheless accounted for 29 percent 
of that year's growth in that sector. 19 This remarkable development is the 
result of twenty years of economic policy change in China. In the early 
Eighties, the regime partially freed up prices in the agricultural sector 
and allowed farmers to retain a portion of their profits. This, in turn, 
unleashed pent-up demand for consumer goods, and so the regime went 
one step further, endorsing the new light industry and consumer goods 
businesses that began to emerge in the rural townships and villages. 
What one observer called an "extraordinarily virtuous economic circle" 
emerged whereby higher prices for food stimulated demand for basic 
consumer products like bicycles, televisions, and refrigerators and, 
increasingly, for light industrial goods such as tractors.20 This process 
sustained growth rates averaging 9 percent for most of the 1980s.21 Non-
farm employment tripled from thirty million to ninety-three million 
people in that decade alone, with some sixteen million new rural 
businesses established.22 
These new entities are seen by western Sinophiles as evidence of the 
emergence of a new private entrepreneurial class in China allowing the 
country, in the words of mainstream economist Barry Naughton, to 
"grow out of the Plan.»23 But many of these new firms were formed with 
19 Stephen Roach, Global: China - Externally or Internally Driven?, MORGAN 
STANLEY GLOBAL ECON. F., April 2, 2003. 
20 JOE STUDWELL, THE CHINA DREAM: THE QUEST FOR THE LAST GREAT 
UNTAPPED MARKET ON EARTH 34 (2002). 
21 Id. at 38. 
22 Id. at 34. 
23 BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE ECONOMIC 
REFORM 1978-1993 (1995); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, The Central 
Role of Entrepreneurs in Economic Reform (2002) (unpublished paper, on file with 
author); John McMillan, China's Nonconformist Reforms (1994) (unpublished paper, 
on file with author). 
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local state and party official endorsement and participation. They have 
become a new competing power center in Chinese society, absorbing 
scarce financial resources. They are also the source of huge new income 
inequalities. Although the country has indeed registered huge gains in 
national income during the last twenty years, the gains have not been 
equally reflected in the personal income of ordinary Chinese households. 
In an articulate and thorough study entitled Inequality and Poverty in 
China, economists Azizur Khan and Carl Riskin take careful aim at the 
impact of market reforms and find the results disturbing.24 Communist 
Party reformer Deng Xiaoping had declared "let some get rich first" and 
the lucky few have done so with a vengeance. Khan and Riskin note that 
"between 1988 and 1995 inequality in the distribution of income in China 
increased sharply [as] China [became] one of the more unequal of the 
Asian developing countries." Thus, despite the impressive macro-level 
gains of the 1980s, as the 1990s unfolded there was, this study concluded, 
"an unusually rapid widening of income inequality ... a much retarded 
rate of poverty reduction in the countryside ... and a significant increase 
in absolute poverty in the towns and cities." In rural China, the 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) have actually worsened 
income inequality as the enterprises offer higher wages but to only a 
small portion of the newly available workforce of former peasants, who 
are mostly forced to survive at or below the poverty line on whatever 
their backyard plots of land can produce. 
Nonetheless, despite its apparent growth, the new so-called private 
sector does not have anywhere near the resources to meet the huge 
industrial needs of Chinese society. The single largest fully private entity 
in China has annual revenues of $600 million, half the turnover of the 
1000th company on the Fortune 1000 list.25 Even today the private sector 
contributes only one-eighth of the nation's gross domestic product and 
employs less than twenty million workers in a nation of 1.2 billion 
people. In any case, the apparent economic miracle began to slow 
precipitously after the initial boost in the 1980s. In the early 1990s, it was 
discovered that the TVEs "had overstated production by more than 40 
percent[,]" wiping out $100 billion from the country's national income 
accounts.26 Much of the actual gain in GNP has been created by the 
regime's continued reliance on heavy capital investment, thus only 
exacerbating inequality and poverty. Khan and Riskin identify what is 
called "investment hunger," especially among local governments that are 
now less constrained by Beijing as the early stages of the reform process 
24 See generally AZIZUR RAHMAN KHAN & CARL RISKIN, INEQUALITY AND 
POVERTY IN CHINA IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2001). 
25 STUDWELL, supra note 20, at 229; The 2003 Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 
2003, available at http://www.fortune.com (last visited Dec. 4, 2003). 
26 [d. at 231-32. 
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loosened the grip of national power.27 "The state allowed an expansion 
of credit to pump up accumulation and drive a wedge between growth of 
GDP and that of personal income.,,28 
Despite the pace of reform, China's state-owned enterprises, or 
SOEs, still control the "commanding heights" of the economy in 
industries like steel, oil, and automobile assembly. In contrast to the 
still-tiny private sector, China's two state-owned oil companies together 
have revenues of more than $80 billion and are comfortably placed on 
Fortune magazine's Asia's Top 50 lise9 In the state sector, one finds that 
instead of the massive privatization that took place in the former Soviet 
Union with such disastrous effect, the regime has tried only partial 
privatizations, while continuing to feed these enterprises massive 
amounts of credit, recycling the savings of China's billion people into 
outdated and poor-performing industrial behemoths. China, in fact, 
actually seems committed more than ever to state control of key 
economic sectors.30 
Many of these enterprises are truly out of a different age-the age 
of Soviet-influenced heavy industry or the American variant, the massive 
auto complex at Ford's River Rouge. These plants were, like their 
Soviet, American or Eastern European counterparts, impressive 
achievements-fifty years ago. But in the context of industry today, they 
are bankrupt. The regime thus finds itself in a trap of its own making. 
Having created this heavy industrial base, it has also created a massive 
industrial working class-or rather its new post-revolution working class 
created this massive industrial base, through the use of the most brutal 
forms of forced labor in the 1950s and 1960s.31 But to restructure now in 
a fashion that would allow these companies to be globally competitive 
would require huge layoffs and huge new capital investment. In the 
spring of 2000, for example, the regime restructured its large state oil 
industry and attempted an initial public offering ("IPO") of shares in the 
newly formed Petro China to global investors, including a listing on the 
New York Stock Exchange. To make the PetroChina IPO even barely 
credible to global capital markets required the layoff of hundreds of 
thousands and a promise to push billions in debt back to the state 
27 KHAN & RISKIN, supra note 24, at 105. 
28 Id. at 151. 
29 Asia's Top 50, FORTUNE, Jul. 21,2003, available at http://www.fortune.com (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2003). 
30 Barry Naughton, Opening the Red Box: Explaining Economic Policy Regimes 
in China, Walter Shorenstein Forum, AsialPacific Research Center, Stanford 
University, Feb. 6, 2003. 
31 See NIGEL HARRIS, THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN: MARX AND MAO IN MODERN 
CHINA (1978). 
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through PetroChina's parent company, China National Petroleum 
(CNPC), which remained entirely in state hands.32 
The only way that the regime believes it can preserve its own power 
in this process is to "muddle through," in Joe Studwell's words.33 Thus, 
the regime allows foreign companies to set up assembly plants in the 
special economic zones in coastal areas and, in the niches not already 
occupied by the state sector, encourages a limited domestic private sector 
to evolve from below. But it cannot allow the resulting inequalities and 
poverty this process causes to become so extreme that workers revolt. 
The regime fears a social explosion, called by the Chinese da luan or total 
chaos, a fear made real by the labor insurgency that took place in the 
spring of 2002 in the oilfields run by PetroChina and in the industrial 
zone of Liaoyang.34 The pall of Hungary in 1956 and Poland in 1980 
continue to hang over the Chinese Communists. 
Meanwhile, the regime continues feeding enough credit to the SOEs 
to keep them alive; conditioning the credit on hoped-for restructuring, 
but not so much credit that inflation is unleashed. Inflation has been a 
continuing problem, causing the regime to punctuate the growth of the 
last two decades with binges of harsh austerity. What many in the West 
view as a struggle between hard and soft-liners, or between a "Maoist" 
left and a "market socialist" right, is really a reflection of managing a 
business cycle with "Chinese characteristics." This is a risky business for 
the regime. The price controls of the late 1980s certainly tamed an 
inflation rate that reached 50 percent in 1988, but that austerity was 
considered a key factor in triggering the 1989 social revolt centered in 
Beijing's Tiananmen Square.35 The protests received widespread popular 
support with marches of a million workers or more in several major 
cities. The regime could only kill the movement by relying on the brutal 
efficiency of crack troops from the People's Liberation Army. After that 
event controlling wages was much less of a problem for several years.36 
Thus, "muddling through" may not be sufficient. The credit that 
sustains the growth process must come from somewhere. The free trade 
zones on the Chinese coast are fed by foreign direct investment. But the 
32 Stephen F. Diamond, The Petro China Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets in 
the Anti-Globalization Era, 29 J. CORP. L. 101 (2003). 
33 STUDWELL, supra note 20, at 215. 
34 50,000 Daqing Oilfield Workers Organise Independent Trade Union, CHINA 
LAB. BULL., Mar. 6, 2002; Mass Paramilitary Deployment Quells Daqing 
Demonstrations, CHINA LAB. BULL., Mar. 26, 2002. 
35 KHAN & RISKIN, supra note 24, at 107. 
36 STUDWELL, supra note 20, at 51 (noting that a "particularly perverse ... effect 
of the aftermath of the Tienanmen killings was that the government was able to see 
through its austerity programme ... without a murmur of dissent. The population was 
too terrified to object .... Urban wages were held down and the urban unemployment 
rate reached its highest level since the start of the decade. "). 
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SOEs and the domestic private sector rely on the recycling of the huge 
savings of ordinary Chinese people. Since the banking system is state-
owned and, in theory, the renminbi is not convertible into foreign 
currencies, Chinese workers, peasants and small businesses are forced to 
finance the continued capital accumulation drive of the Communist 
regime. The whole game depends on the regime's continuing top-down 
control of that financial system. Thus, promises of convertibility of the 
currency as early as 1993 are now put off well into the future. 31 
Of course, if the renminbi were freely tradable on the world markets 
and if ordinary Chinese savers could freely hold their savings in foreign 
banks or invest them in the equities of European or American companies 
as their counterparts do in the West and much of Asia, there would most 
likely be a massive "run on the bank" as the value of Chinese assets 
would be forced to come into line with global values. The pressure on 
domestic values is so great that Stud well argues that even without 
convertibility or an opening of the financial sector a bank run is still a 
possibility: "[e]verything comes down to psychology ... the psychology of 
the ordinary Chinese people," he notes.38 From this vantage point, events 
like the 1989 Tiananmen revolt take on new meaning. China may be in 
the grips of an investment bubble that, once it bursts, will cause a social 
and economic crisis that dwarfs that which afflicted most of Asia in the 
late 1990s. In the case of China, the "hot money" that sparked the Asian 
financial crisis is actually represented by the domestic savings of ordinary 
Chinese, fueled by the bulging domestic reserves linked to Chinese 
exports. A "flood of credit [in the 1990s] allowed an over-investment 
binge that caused the ratio of private investment to personal 
consumption to peak at 83 percent in 1993 and to remain above 70 
percent thereafter.,,39 The regime's credibility, and therefore its power, 
depends on maintaining the credibility of its economic policy. It is not 
just that the regime fears a Solidarity-like protest movement rising up in 
reaction to political repression or unemployment; it also fears a tearing 
away of the veil that covers up the country's financial fragility. This 
could, in turn, cause the population to lose their faith in the regime and, 
in turn, trigger a massive political upheaval. 
What are the escape routes for the regime? A massive debt-for-
equity swap is one. Since the debts the state has accumulated using 
domestic savings must eventually be repaid and in the meantime the 
state must pay interest, the debts can get very expensive. The state-
owned banks now hold massive amounts in non-performing loans made 
to the SOEs and the TVEs. On top of that, the government has huge 
37 STUD WELL, supra note 20, at 211-212. 
38 [d. at 214. 
39 DUNCAN, supra note 9, at 159. 
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under-funded pension liabilities. When these massive liabilities are 
added together, Studwell estimates a debt-to-equity ratio of nearly 500 
percent for the state sector-outstripping even South Korea on the verge 
of its economic collapse in 1997.40 So by creating stock markets, the 
regime has tried to encourage Chinese savers to invest instead in equity 
issued by these same state companies. The regime even dreams of large 
mutual funds rescuing them from the pension trap they face, hoping they 
can convince Chinese workers to trade the "iron" rice bowl guarantees of 
an earlier era for the volatile world of publicly-traded equities. But 
equity holders expect capital gains over time and hope that inside 
managers will payout regular dividends, and neither is legally mandated. 
And in China, senior corporate insiders, for the most part still members 
of the ruling Communist Party, have the additional advantage that they 
need not fear the disciplinary effect of a potential takeover by 
competitors or financial players since there is, as of yet, no competitive 
market for corporate control in China.4 ! This shift to equity finance 
explains the stock market mania that hit China in the 1990s. The regime 
engaged, it appears, in a massive "pump and dump" scheme touting 
share ownership in companies that by any stretch of the imagination 
were actually worthless. In the first half of 1992 the Shanghai stock 
market index registered an unsustainable gain of 1200 percent.42 
A second strategy has been to turn to foreign stock markets, first in 
Hong Kong, but more recently to the London and New York Stock 
Exchanges. There Chinese companies have been notably less successful. 
The pump-and-dump has not fooled quite as many investors. Where 
Chinese companies trade their stock both at home and on the Hong 
Kong exchange, the shares sold in Hong Kong trade at a substantial 
discount, as much as 85 percent, giving the outside world some idea of 
the discount factor that one might have to apply to the entire Chinese 
economy if its assets were freely tradable.43 Finally, the regime has 
encouraged the establishment of foreign investment in the so-called 
Special Economic Zones. But even the explosive growth of the Zones 
makes a relatively small dent in this massive country. More importantly, 
their potential future growth is limited. Most of these plants are only 
final assembly points in a global assembly line so that the value added by 
Chinese workers is a small percentage of top-line revenue. The sector 
shipped $150 billion worth of goods in 2000, but less than 25 percent of 
that was value added in the free trade areas in China.44 The state sector 
cannot compete yet in quality and reliability with the foreign suppliers 
40 STUD WELL, supra note 20, at 206. 
41 Stephen F. Diamond, The PetroChina Syndrome, supra note 32, at 127. 
42 ld. at 65. 
43 ld. at 213. 
44 [d. at 226. 
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that feed parts into the assembly plants. In addition, the companies are 
heavily dependent on the infrastructure provided by coastal proximity to 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Interestingly, as Khan and Riskin note, despite 
what free trade theory might predict, the industrialization in this and the 
TVE sectors "so far. . . has been quite employment-hostile" with 
increases in employment declining "drastically" even as output spurted 
ahead.4s 
The social and political effects of this process are equally striking. 
As a result of this reform process there are estimates that as many as 20 
million people a year are leaving the rural areas of China for the cities in 
search of work.46 To put this in perspective, a single year's inflow of new 
urban workers in China is equivalent to the entire manufacturing 
employment base of the United States. In fact, because of the recent 
downturn in the U.S. economy some 2 million jobs have been lost and 
manufacturing employment in the U.S. has now dropped to a twenty-
year low of 16 million jobs. This has now made the U.S.-China trade 
balance a politically sensitive issue inside the United States.47 China's 
trade surplus with the United States is now the world's largest, reaching 
$83 billion in 2001, while the balance with Mexico was in surplus only to 
the tune of $30 billion.48 Even Japan, America's most feared competitor 
in the 1980s, had a surplus of only $69 billion that year.49 This has led to 
pressure by the U.S. government on China to revalue its currency, 
currently pegged to the dollar at a rate of roughly 8 to 1, thus making 
U.S. exports relatively more expensive.50 Meanwhile, as discussed below, 
domestically China is experiencing an unprecedented wave of worker 
unrest. Thus, the reform process is creating internal and external 
imbalances that are increasingly the stimulus for domestic social conflict 
and global tension. 
45 KHAN & RISKIN, supra note 24, at 152-53. 
46 Karby Leggett, The Outlook: Under Pressure, China Blesses Private Sector, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2000, at Al ("20 million new job seekers enter the labor market 
every year); Andy Xie, China: The Virtuous Cycle Continues, MORGAN STANLEY 
GLOBAL ECON. F., Mar. 6, 2001 ("China's biggest challenge is to create 20 million jobs 
a year to absorb the entire labor surplus over two decades"). 
47 Neil King, Trade With China is Heating Up As a Business and Political Issue, 
WALL ST. J., Jui. 30, 2003, at AI; David Barboza, Textile Industry Seeks Trade Limits 
on Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Jui. 25, 2003, at Cl; Karby Leggett & Peter Wonacott, Surge 
in Exports From China Gives a lolt to Global Industry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10,2002, at 
AI. 
48 DUNCAN, supra note 9, at 201. 
49 Id. 
50 Chen Zhao, The Fed is in a dangerous game with China, FIN. TIMES (London, 
England), Jui. 30, 2003, at 11; David DeRosa, Everybody Is Prodding China to 
Revalue the Yuan, BLOOMBERG, Jui. 11, 2003. 
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III. CHINESE TRADE UNIONISM 
A central feature of China's approach to economic policy is to 
maintain tight control over its workforce even as it opens up the 
economy. Thus the country's policy towards trade unionism is crucial to 
understanding the relationship of China to the world economy today. As 
is widely accepted in political theory and history, trade unions provide a 
counterweight to the power of government and business interests in a 
modern industrial society. The aggressive spread of neo-liberal policies 
through globalization has undermined the ability of unions to play this 
role in the post-Cold War world. But the need for trade unions has only 
increased. The political impact of trade unions is widely recognized. The 
effort to organize a union requires certain political liberties, such as free 
speech, the right of assembly and the right to have grievances redressed. 
These broader political liberties run parallel to core labor standards like 
the right to join the union of one's own choice and the rights to organize, 
to bargain, and, if necessary, to strike. A country with a strong union 
movement is also likely, therefore, to be a country with a vibrant 
democracy and respect for the rule of law. 
These rights are still largely absent in China and this is reflected in 
the status of the labor movement there. The ACFTU is simply a creature 
of the Chinese state and the Communist Party. It is obligated by its own 
rules and law to act as a transmission belt for party and state policy. As 
labor unrest has spread across China in the last few years, the ACFTU 
has sat on the sidelines, emerging on occasion only to condemn these 
rank-and-file efforts to secure jobs, pensions and other basic economic 
benefits. In the wake of the mass protests in the spring of 2002 by 
workers in the metal industry of Liaoyang that led to the imprisonment 
of Xiao Yunliang and Yao Fuxin,51 the ACFTU publicly condemned the 
two worker leaders at the annual conference of the ILO in Geneva for 
"illegally demonstrating" and charging them with having "burned cars 
and destroying public property" although the latter charge was never 
brought forward in court.52 Later, in a reply to the ILO's own 
investigation of the Liaoyang events, the Chinese government accused 
the leaders of "terrorism and sabotage, ,,53 though these charges also were 
never brought against the activists in the eventual court case discussed 
above.54 During the same time period workers in the oil industry in 
Daqing in northern China organized demonstrations against cuts in 
severance benefits. Their actions were condemned as "unacceptable and 
51 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
52 Liaoyang Workers' Struggle, supra note 1, at 11. 
53 [d. 
54 See Criminal Verdict, supra note 1, at 71. 
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illegal" by the ACFTU.55 This is a pattern that is all too familiar to 
students of societies in transition from Stalinism to modern capitalism. 
There is little hope that China will avoid this pattern. And thus the 
international labor movement has generally given its support to efforts to 
form genuine, independent unions in China as part of the support for the 
development of the rule of law and respect for human rights.56 
Independent trade unions are outlawed in China.57 The ACFTU 
maintains what the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
("ICFTU"), the leading global labor umbrella organization, calls a "trade 
union monopoly."58 The right to strike does not exist.59 An effort to 
establish a Workers Autonomous Federation (WAF) as part of the wider 
Democracy Movement of 1989 was met with particularly harsh 
repression. Many affiliates of that Federation are still in prison or labor 
camps. Amnesty International details numerous ongoing abuses of 
workers for their organizing and other activity.60 Arrests and arbitrary 
detentions were made throughout 1999 as labor unrest increased due to 
the worsening economic situation. Here are some of the examples they 
report: 
Li Qingxi, a laid-off worker from the Datong coalmine in 
Shanxi province, was arrested in January when he posted 
publicly a statement calling for independent trade unions. He 
was sentenced in March without charge or trial to one year of 
"re-education through labor," reportedly to be served "at 
home." Zhang Shanuang, a labor rights activist from Hunan 
province, was detained in July after trying to set up a group to 
help laid-off workers. He was sentenced in December to 10 
years' imprisonment, accused of having "illegally provided 
information to overseas hostile organizations and 
individuals," reportedly for speaking about farmers' protests 
in his province in a Radio Free Asia interview.61 
The widely respected China Labour Bulletin, based in Hong Kong, 
confirms that the process of "economic restructuring has led to huge 
pressures on the Chinese labour market ... many workers laid off from 
55 Press Release, CHINA LAB. BULL., Mar. 6, 2002 (on file with author). 
56 INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS EXECUTIVE BD., ICFTU 
CHINA POLICY (November 27-29, 2002) (on file with author) ("noting that the 
ACFTU is not an independent trade union organization and, therefore, cannot be 
regarded as an authentic voice of Chinese workers"). 
57 INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS (2003) [hereinafter ICFTU SURVEY]' 
58 Id. 
59 See discussion infra at notes 84-92. 
60 AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT 1999 (1999). AMNESTY INT'L, People's Republic of 
China: Labour unrest and the right to freedom of association and expression: "Workers 
want to eat - Workers want a job," AI INDEX: ASA 17/015/2002 (Apr. 2002). 
61 AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT 1999 (1999). 
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SOEs have expressed dissatisfaction with the long working hours, short-
term contracts and miserly benefits that more than not await them in the 
private sector."62 Linked to this dissatisfaction is a rise in labor disputes, 
despite the frightening risk that such voicing of grievances to official 
bodies entails. Even the state-controlled Labor Disputes and Arbitration 
Committees reported a 58 percent increase in cases heard in the first six 
months of 1999. Of course, the vast majority of such disputes are 
reported only as "solved" with few details available on the facts. There 
are serious procedural obstacles to bringing such disputes to the dispute 
resolution bodies, so it is unknown how many on the job grievances go 
unreported.63 In fact, the worst fears of critics of the PetroChina IPO and 
restructuring process came true in the spring of 2002 when massive 
demonstrations by laid-off workers took place in the Daqing oilfields 
owned by CNPC and PetroChina.64 These were soon followed by large 
protests by unemployed workers in several parts of China, including an 
unusual demonstration by workers in Beijing itself. Arrests of protest 
leaders such as the fathers of Yao Dan and Xiao Yu were paired with 
modest economic concessions by the regime thus ending this particular 
wave of unrest.65 However, one sociologist calls these demonstrations 
evidence of a "labor insurgency" underway in China.66 
All of China's industrial workers are members of the only "trade 
union" body allowed to exist-the ACFfU. The ACFfU is a constituent 
body of the Chinese State and thus is controlled by Communist Party 
cadre. As in the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European 
satellites, this is a "trade union" in name only. It is, in fact, in the 
Chinese regime's own words, "a mass organization of the working class" 
and it serves as a transmission belt for the party and state leadership. 
The Communist Party appoints all of its officials. As the ACFfU itself 
stated in 1990: "the administration of union cadres by the Party is an 
unchangeable principle. The ACFfU should work together with the 
Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party in laying down regulations concerning cadre 
management and in monitoring the nomination, investigation, election, 
approval and allocation of union leaders." The same document goes on 
to state that: 
62 Feature: Unemployment, 50 CHINA LAB. BULL. (Sept.-Oct. 1999). 
63 See Workers' Forum: The Struggle Continues, 51 CHINA LAB. BULL. (Nov.-Dec. 
1999). 
64 Radio Broadcast Transcript, Daqing Oilfield Workers' Struggle, CHINA LAB. 
BULL., Mar. 6, 2002. 
65 Press Release, Amnesty Int'!, "Subversion" Charges Must Not Be Used to 
Imprison Rights Activists (Jan. 14, 2003). 
66 Ching Kwan Lee, From the Specter of Mao to the Spirit of the Law: Labor 
Insurgency in China, 31 THEORY & SOC'y 189 (2002) [hereinafter Specter of Mao]. 
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trade unions must resolutely oppose any organization or 
individual expressing political views countering those of the 
Party. . . On discovering the formation of workers' 
organizations which oppose the Four Cardinal Principles67 
and endanger the national regime, the trade union must 
immediately report to same-level party committees and 
senior-level unions, and must resolutely expose and dissolve 
them. When necessary, the union should demand the 
dissolution of such organizations by the government in 
accordance with the law. Concerning organizations initiated 
by workers out of their specific economic interests, the union 
should advise them to dissolve and terminate their activities 
through persuasion and counseling.68 
Thus, the ACFfU serves as the "eyes and ears" of the state inside every 
workplace. Far from supporting democratic and free trade unionism, the 
ACFfU's central purpose is to carry out State and Party directives and 
to do everything it can to insure that all workers fall into line as well. 
It is no surprise to find out, therefore, that the ACFfU is viewed by 
the state as a vehicle for encouraging worker support for the very 
economic reform process that is devastating the social conditions of tens 
of millions of workers. Dan Gallin, then General Secretary of the 
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, 
Tobacco and Allied Workers Associations ("IUF"), noted after a mission 
to Hong Kong in December, 1997, that earlier that month at a meeting of 
the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
Hu Jintao (then a senior member of the Chinese Communist Party and 
now President of China) urged trade union leaders to "arouse workers' 
enthusiasm about reforms in [the state-owned enterprises], especially 
about turning losses into profits and to complete the tasks set forth 
during the recent 15th party congress." Hu Jintao added that trade 
unions should "encourage workers to contribute to the development of 
new products and technological improvements," that they should provide 
more job opportunities and professional training for laid-off workers, 
and encourage them to change their old ideas and find new jobs 
themselves.,,69 Those who do not conform to the new economic order are 
subject to ACFfU "mobilizations." The Chinese political police (Public 
67 The Four Cardinal Principles include: 1) To keep to the socialist road; 2) To 
uphold the people's democratic dictatorship; 3) To uphold the leadership by the 
Communist Party; and 4) To uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
See CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (CPC) amended and 
adopted at the 16th CPC National Congress on Nov. 14, 2002 (on file with author). 
68 INT'L UNION OF FOODWORKERS, REP. OF THE INT'L UNION OF FOODWORKERS 
ON MISSION TO CHINA 18 (1997), available at http://www.global-labouLorgichina.htm 
[hereinafter IUF MISSION TO CHINA). 
69 [d. at 4. 
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Security Bureau or "PSB") have issued "guidelines" that state that "the 
union[s] must ... co-ordinate with the PSB, organize 'public order and 
prevention teams' to protect the internal security and order of the 
enterprises, as well as social order. Staff and workers should be 
mobilized to struggle against all forms of criminal and illegal behavior. 
The union must also assist the relevant authorities to deal adequately 
with the education and employment of dismissed employees, workers 
who have committed errors and those have completed sentences and 
been released."70 This kind of directive can only be characterized as 
chilling. 
Far from encouraging progressive change, as China has integrated 
itself into the world economy, its approach to trade unions has remained 
rigidly closed. A 2001 revision to the Trade Union Law, last revised in 
1992, only confirmed this. A new version of Article 4 of the Law, for 
example, confirms the obligation of the ACFfU to: " ... take economic 
construction as the centre, adhere to the socialist road, uphold the 
people's democratic dictatorship, abide by the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party, adhere to Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought 
and Deng Xiaoping Theory.,,71 The Law also mandates that the ACFfU 
role in the face of a strike is to " ... assist the enterprise or institution in 
making proper preparations for resuming work and restoring work order 
as soon as possible.'>72 The China Labour Bulletin concludes that such 
prOVisIOns: 
reaffirm ... the ACFTU's subordinate relationship to both 
the government and the party at three levels: the union must 
abide by the Party's guiding principles; the union must 
subordinate its organization to the Party machinery; and the 
union must perform the function of carrying out the wishes of 
the Party in its intervention in labour disputes at local or 
enterprise level.73 
In addition to the dramatic human rights picture and the suppression 
of basic trade union freedoms, the general situation of workers presents 
additional problems. Unemployment and forced migration have already 
been mentioned. Other problems include the widespread use of 
underemployment, short-term work, and contract labor, the continued 
control of labor mobility by the state and massive violations of basic 
health and safety precautions. Official statistics report nearly seven 
million unemployed urban workers, but the China Labour Bulletin 
70 [d. 
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estimates that the total is closer to 21 million.74 And even official 
statistics admit to 30 million "more than needed" workers in the urban 
areas. These are now supplemented by some 80 to 100 million "floating 
people" who have left their villages looking for work in other areas of 
the country.75 
Despite the need for a massive shift in employment to new entities, 
the state fears that uncontrolled mobility could open the door to 
organized opposition to the regime. Thus, it has largely kept in place a 
decades-old system of labor registration-the hukou system.76 Under 
hukou every Chinese citizen is required to "have a registration with the 
hukou authority or hukou police at birth." In theory no Chinese may 
work or live outside of the area where they were registered at birth. To 
accommodate some economic pressures, the regime has instituted a 
system for providing workers with temporary residence permits. 
Punishment of both employers and employees is meted out if workers 
are hired without a permit.n 
Nonetheless, in the face of the officially-backed repression of 
genuine trade unionism, workers have consistently attempted to organize 
independent movements throughout the history of post-1949 Communist 
China.78 Far from passively accepting the ideological claim of the regime 
to be a "workers' state," Chinese workers have defied the mythology of 
the regime in successive waves of unrest. Interestingly, in the first few 
years of Communist rule the newly-established ACFTU was independent 
and militant-somewhat like the trade unions in the first few years of 
Castro's rule. But as in Cuba the state soon stepped in and deposed the 
independent ACFTU leaders, turning the organization into a party-run 
transmission belt organization after the classic Stalinist model. Worker 
restiveness did not take long to reemerge, however, with a strike wave in 
1956-57 that was apparently directly influenced by the Hungarian 
uprising of that same year. Repression followed but so did periodic 
74 The official figures can be found in Fei-Ling Wang, Labor Issues and Foreign 
Direct Investment in the PRC, in ADVANCES IN CHINESE INDUSTRIAL STUDIES - THE 
MANAGERIAL PROCESS AND IMPACf OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GREATER CHINA 
177 (c. Jayachandran et al. eds., 1999). The China Labour Bulletin estimates are 
described in their study Feature: Unemployment, supra note 62. 
75 See Fei-Ling Wang, [d. at 40. 
76 See id. at 178. 
77 On the hukou system and the contemporary Chinese labor market, see Fei-Ling 
Wang, Floaters, moonlighters, and the underemployed: A national labor market with 
Chinese characteristics, 7 J. CONTEMPORARY CHINA 459 (1998); see also Section 301 
Petition, AFL-CIO, Mar. 16, 2004, available at http://www.aficio.org/issuespolitics/ 
globaleconomy/upload/china_petition.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). 
78 The following summary of independent worker activity is based on Worker 
Passivity in China: A Maoist Myth, CHINA LAB. BULL., Nov. 2003 available at http:// 
iso.china-Iabour.org.hk/isol [hereinafter Worker Passivity]. 
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worker unrest, particularly during the Cultural Revolution and in the 
wake of the death of Chou En Lai in the 1970s. In each case, the state 
cracked down. In the early 1980s the Democracy Wall movement 
emerged and included specific references to Poland's Solidarity. 
Sociologist Ching Kwan Lee notes that "[t]he ascendance of the Polish 
Solidarity Movement emboldened Chinese workers ... to take action."79 
As economic reform under Deng gathered steam, worker unrest 
resurfaced. The spring 1989 movement led to the most important period 
of independent worker organizing in recent years. The activists of the 
newly established Beijing WAF, which sparked numerous WAFs all over 
the country, initially met with some hostility from the student 
demonstrators, who restricted the workers' presence in Tiananmen to a 
corner of the square.so The China Labour Bulletin describes what 
happened: 
As the numbers of students directly participating in the 
Democracy Movement slowly began to dwindle, the WAFs 
became stronger. Links between WAFs all over China were 
being forged and some activists traveled to Beijing for 
discussions. Correspondingly the position of the ACFTU 
hardened towards the WAFs and on June 2, 1989 the official 
Workers Daily called for the banning of the WAFs as illegal 
organisations. The call was perhaps premature. Two days 
later government troops fought their way into the Square and 
made straight for the BWAF tents. In the repression that 
followed, thousands of workers suspected of taking part in 
WAF organisations were rounded up and shot or sent to 
prison.sl 
According to Ching Kwan Lee, "in May and June 1989, workers in 
Beijing, Shanghai and other cities left the confines of factory gates and 
their collective action took the forms of public protests, independent 
unionism and political mobilization.,,82 She notes that workers detained 
in the 1989 crackdown "receiv[ed] the heaviest [prison] sentences."83 
Thus, the burgeoning workers' movement was central to the dynamic of 
the 1989 events. Sporadic efforts to organize independent unions and 
even political parties continued through the 1990s, but with leaders 
almost invariably ending up in prison. 
79 Ching Kwan Lee, Pathways of Labor Insurgency, in CHINESE SOCIETY: 
CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 48 (Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden eds., 
2000) [hereinafter Labor Insurgency]. 
80 Id. at 56, Lee notes the "Beijing students' disdainful stance towards workers' 
participation in the TIananmen protests." Eventually, though, several students 
became active leaders of the WAF movement. 
81 Worker Passivity, supra note 78. 
82 Labor Insurgency, supra note 79, at 49. 
83 Id. 
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In the late 1990s, however, widespread unrest began to reemerge 
among workers responding to massive shutdowns of state industries. In 
many instances these companies were being restructured with the crown 
jewels of what remained being appropriated by party insiders. Most of 
these protests were small (a few dozen or a few hundred at most). But 
there have been some important exceptions. Chinese coal miners face 
some of the most horrendous working conditions to be found in China 
and have been heavily victimized by mine closures. The Labour Bulletin 
report noted that "in 1999, the PLA was employed to put down a three-
day protest by 20,000 miners in Liaoning province where miners were 
reported to have taken over a town. "84 There were also steady reports in 
the same time period of other "large-scale clashes between miners and 
armed police over closures and wage arrears. ,,85 
In the spring of 2002, as noted earlier, this unrest hit the famed 
Daqing oil fields, where PetroChina had begun a massive downsizing 
project after its IPO in 2000.86 Tens of thousands of workers took to the 
streets there to protest an attempt by the regime to cut back on promised 
severance benefits. The part the ACFfU played in these events 
demonstrates its true role. Its representatives called the Daqing oil 
workers protest "illegal and unacceptable" because according to the 
ACFfU constitution new unions could only be established by existing 
unions from above and not by workers themselves. It said that it had "no 
role to play" in the battle by these workers for their pensions because of 
official instructions they had received from the Communist Party 
committee in the oil industry that their role was only to "understand" the 
situation, not to advocate the workers' interests. In the words of the 
ACFfU representative in Daqing: "[u]nder the union system in China, 
the organizational relation of a union is defined by the party .... [T]he 
trade union has a subordinate relationship to the Party, and a trade 
union must be set up according to an organizational structure of 
leadership that runs from top to bottom." Tiananmen Square veteran 
union activist Han Dongfang issued a statement condemning the role 
played by the ACFfU in the Daqing protest and urged the ACFfU to 
recognize the right of the workers to organize their own union. For such 
efforts in the past Han Dongfang has been condemned at the ILO's 
84 Worker Passivity, supra note 78. 
85 [d. 
86 When the huge Daqing oil reserves were exploited during the reign of 
Chairman Mao, the workers of Daqing were widely hailed as heroes. The oil workers 
were the basis of a classic Stalinist labor emulation campaign as Mao told China to 
"learn from Daqing" and rewarded so-called "Iron Man" Wang Jinxi for his 
prodigious productivity. This approach to labor discipline originated in the Soviet 
Union under the term Stakhanovism. John Gittings, Strikes Convulse China's Oi/-
Rich Heartlands, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2002 at 20. 
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annual conference by China's representatives as a "criminal." Ching 
Kwan Lee's research confirms the "ambiguous and conciliatory role 
played by the local ACFTU."87 Even in the foreign investor-controlled 
Special Economic Zones, where some western union advocates of a 
rapprochement with the ACFfU feel it could act to genuinely defend 
worker interests, "[u]nion officials were ... helpless in defending workers 
during strikes in foreign-owned enterprises when public security 
personnel were often called into the [company] compounds by 
management to intimidate strikers."88 Indeed, Lee notes that the 
widespread reports of high-density unionization rates in the foreign 
enterprise sector largely reflect "ACFfU-approved unions [that] were 
led and staffed by management personnel who were mainly responsible 
for collecting union fees, organizing birthday parties and recreational 
events. These union leaders were also salaried shop floor supervisors or 
section heads in the factory administration. "89 
A central theme of the state's behavior in the current period is to try 
to placate pure economic demands (over issues such as severance pay) 
while clamping down when the actions move to the formation of some 
kind of independent workers' organization. Since repression of potential 
unrest is so crucial, it is no surprise that until very recently the head of 
the ACFfU, Wei lianxing, was the same government official who as a 
member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's 
seven member elite Politburo had been in charge of the regime's anti-
crime "Strike Hard" campaign. This campaign was aimed at suppressing 
alleged corruption and led to widespread arrests and use of the death 
penalty against thousands of party officials and businessmen.9o Wei's 
approach to independent unions could not be more clear. He views them 
as "an attempt to 'westernize' and 'pluralize' us" by "our enemies, at 
home and abroad" who "seek to overturn the leadership of the Party and 
subvert the socialist system."91 The Labour Bulletin concluded its report 
by noting that: 
87 Labor Insurgency, supra note 79, at 51. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, China: One Thousand Executed in Strike Hard 
Campaign Against Crime (July 2,1996), available at http://www.amnesty.it/news/1996/ 
31707196.htm (condemning campaign as "state killing on a massive scale" and 
"widespread arbitrary violation of the most basic right to life"). A revival of this 
approach is underway now in China. China Punishes 12,000 Criminals Involved in 
Organized Crimes, PEOPLE'S DAILY (Beijing), March 11, 2002. 
91 Wei, Jianxing, Conscientiously Implement the Spirit of the Fifth Plenary 
Session of the 15th Central Committee and Speed Up the Organising and Establishing 
of Trade Unions in New Enterprises, Address at Work Meeting on Organising and 
Establishing Trade Unions in New Enterprises (Nov. 12, 2000), in Trini Leung, 
ACFTU and Union Organizing, CHINA LAB. BULL., Apr. 2002. 
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Where the state has definitely not adopted a "soft" approach 
has been when labour organisers have attempted to take 
advantage of the situation and set up labour organisations. 
These are rarely actually in workplaces. Unemployment has 
been such a major feature of recent economic trends that 
many of the angry workers involved are protesting because 
they have no workplaces to go to. The case of Hunan-based 
independent trade unionist Zhang Shanguang is an example 
of how brutal the regime can be in dealing with labour 
organisers. While Zhang's association for laid off workers 
was largely apolitical, the attempt to register the organisation 
legally-on the back of China's signing of the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-was a 
profoundly political act. Zhang Shanguang was locked up for 
trying to organise the Shu Pu County Association for the 
Rights of Laid Off Workers. Zhang has a history of labour 
organising and in 1989 was sentenced for his involvement in 
the Hunan Workers Autonomous Federation (HWAF). On 
his release, he was blacklisted by employers and denied work. 
In the more recent arrest, the police handed Zhang's wife an 
official "Notice of Detention," which stated that Zhang was a 
threat to national security and was being detained under 
Article 61 of the Criminal Procedures Bill. After a secret 
hearing lasting two hours, he was sentenced to 10 years.92 
As in most authoritarian regimes the real fear is of independent 
organization. A real trade union would rob the official state labor 
organization of its legitimacy and thus would open the door to deeper 
political change. 
A real trade union movement in China could also have an important 
economic, as well as political, effect. Economists have noted three major 
macro-level imbalances in China today: limited domestic demand, 
deflationary pressures and regional unevenness in the pattern of 
development. A trade union movement would, through genuine 
adversarial bargaining, force the regime to be more transparent and 
balanced in its economic decision-making. Wages would increase, thus 
stimulating domestic demand and price levels. This could lead to a more 
balanced domestic development pattern but also weaken global tensions 
with countries that already recognize trade unions. Financial analyst 
Richard Duncan, for example, has recently called for the establishment 
of a global minimum wage for workers in export industries as a means to 
restore balance to the global economy, particularly because of the impact 
of cheap labor in China:93 
92 Worker Passivity, supra note 78. 
93 DUNCAN, supra note 9, at 233. 
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Increasing wages in the developing world would augment 
global aggregate demand. It would succeed in putting more 
money in people's pockets, something that traditional 
monetary policy is incapable of doing in [the] post-bubble 
environment [the world is now experiencing.] . . . As 
consumption expanded in the newly industrializing countries, 
so would demand for imported goods, an important 
development that would help restore balanced trade in the 
world.94 
65 
But to make this argument about the impact of a genuine labor 
movement in China is to point to a post-Communist China that is no 
longer wed to the "race to the bottom" export-led model of growth and 
that is precisely why the regime must resist in every conceivable forum 
such a movement. 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARENA 
This concern for the wider political and economic impact of a real 
trade union movement leads to the third area of concern: the role that 
international legal institutions are playing in the process. Unfortunately, 
rather than serve as a reminder of the importance of balance, equity and 
accountability in a major socio-economic experiment like that occurring 
in China today, these institutions are actually pushing the regime 
forward. There are many explicit examples of this process when, for 
example, the World Bank provides technical advice on the downsizing 
and privatization of key industries. But just as problematic are those 
steps taken at the WTO and the ILO that undermine the ability of 
independent unions to emerge as counterweights to the muted form of 
shock therapy now underway in China. The story of the granting of 
Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China by the United States is 
relatively well-known.95 In doing so, the United States gave up one of its 
most important levers of influence over the progress of labor rights and 
human rights in China. Less well known, however, is the groundwork 
that was laid for China's entry into the global economy at the ILO and 
the WTO. 
One of the important achievements of the international labor rights 
movement over the last decade has been its promotion of the concept of 
"core labor standards" that comprise those rights seen as essential to the 
development of an effective trade union movement. This campaign has 
given labor activists in many arenas the ability to push for a coherent 
global agenda. Recognition of the core standards has now been made in 
a variety of environments, though the precise content of the standards 
94 DUNCAN, supra note 9, at 238. 
95 See Bridging the Divide, supra note 18. 
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varies slightly across institutional settings. In 1998 the ILO's 
International Labour Conference, its central body made up of all its 
member states together with worker and employer representatives, 
issued a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
The Declaration stated that there are four fundamental rights which its 
members had "an obligation ... to respect, to promote and to realize," 
including: "freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.,,96 Respect for these same principles is now found in the 
emerging markets investment strategy of the California Public 
Employees Retirement System ("CaIPERS"), the world's most 
important institutional investor, and in the Generalized System of 
Preferences in the global trade regime.97 Even the WTO recognized its 
members' obligation to foster respect for Core Labor Standards at its 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996.98 
But there is a catch. The ILO and the WTO each carved out an 
exception to the core standards that flatly contradicts the central 
principle of international labor solidarity that has guided the 
international labor rights movement since the founding of the ILO in 
1919. Paragraph 5 of the ILO's Fundamental Declaration states that: 
The International Labour Conference ... Stresses that labour 
standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes, 
and that nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be 
invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition, the 
comparative advantage of any country should in no way be 
called into question by this Declaration and its follow-up. 
96 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session, 
Geneva (June, 1998) available at http://www.ilo.orgipublic/english!standards/decU 
declaration/textltindex.htm (last modified Dec. 8, 2000). The fundamental rights are 
made up by eight fundamental ILO Conventions, including: 1) Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87); 2) 
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); 3) Forced 
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); 4) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 
(No. 105); 5) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 
111); 6) Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); 7) Minimum Age 
Convention, 1973 (No. 138); 8) Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 
182). INT'L LABOUR ORGANISATION, FUNDAMENTAL ILO CONVENTIONS, available at 
http://www.ilo.orglpublic/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/index.htm (last 
modified Oct. 20, 2000). 
97 Press Release, CaIPERS, CalPERS Board Takes Action on Investment and 
Other Measures, Nov. 15,2000, available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/whatsnew/press/ 
200011115a.htm. 
98 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, P4, 36 I.L.M. 218, 221. 
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But labor standards are promulgated precisely because they are 
protectionist: protective of the relatively advanced conditions won by 
workers in economies with established trade unions. Many of these 
protections were won only after bitter battle with employers and 
governments alike. Thus, the Preamble to the ILO's Constitution, 
drafted at the ILO's opening conference in 1919, states that "the failure 
of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the 
way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own 
countries."99 This concept of labor standards as a protective floor 
beneath which the world should not fall was reaffirmed at the 
Philadelphia Convention that restarted the ILO in the post-World War II 
world. Thus, it was precisely the need to avoid the allegedly non-existent 
"race to the bottom" in global labor standards that explains the very 
origin of the ILO. 
As former National Labor Relations Board Chair and leading labor 
law scholar William B. Gould IV has pointed out, this principle of 
international labor solidarity has a firm basis in domestic U.S. law. 
The idea of unfair competition ... is also reflected in portions 
of the National Labor Relations Act's own preamble, enacted 
to promote freedom of association and collective bargaining 
in the Untied States shortly after the United States joined the 
ILO .... Interestingly, in enacting the NLRA, Congress 
announced that a primary purpose of this policy was to 
remove the downward pressure on wages that a failure to 
protect collective bargaining produces. tOO 
It was no surprise, therefore, that the proposed carve-out language that 
aimed to protect the cheap labor export model of growth found in 
developing countries was the cause of bitter debate in the ILO during its 
1998 Conference. The United States representative (from the Clinton 
Administration) and the delegates representing the trade union 
movement bitterly opposed the language, while many developing 
countries, including China, pushed hard for it. If the leading United 
Nations agency responsible for promoting global labor standards was 
unable, or unwilling, to stand up to the pressures of globalization-
tossing aside an 80-year-old core principle in favor of cheap labor and 
the return of sweatshops-is it any surprise that the international labor 
movement finds itself in such a challenging position? 
99 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, pt. XIII § I headnote, 225 Conso!. T.S. 188. 
100 Gould, supra note 16, at 720. Oddly, Professor Gould seems to accept the 
notion that Congress had it right about the impact of a race to the bottom on interstate 
commerce in 1935 when it passed the NLRA but that the international labor 
movement has now got it wrong in suggesting that the weight of hundreds of millions 
of workers barely paid a subsistence wage are no longer an obstacle to the progressive 
development of international commerce. 
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As if to add insult to injury, in the summer of 2002, the ILO elevated 
the representative of China's ACFfU to an alternate seat on the ILO's 
Governing Body.I01 Apparently some ILO delegates attempted to justify 
the vote, which meant that Israel's Histadrut would lose its seat, as a fair 
protest of Ariel Sharon's policies towards the Palestinian people. The 
China Labour Bulletin called this a "ploy" and stated that those who fell 
for it "are guilty of confusion, at best, and [of] a serious lack of principle 
at worst." Unfortunately, this move seemed to echo the attempt of some 
in the international labor movement who have advocated a process of 
"constructive engagement" with the ACFfU.102 An argument that these 
same activists dismissed with derision in the anti-apartheid movement is 
now welcomed despite the lack of any evidence that such "engagement" 
helps Chinese workers. The China Labour Bulletin condemns this 
approach as "the creeping legitimation" of the ACFfU. 
V. GLOBAL LABOR'S ApPROACH TO CHINA 
As might be expected, the international labor movement has largely 
been very supportive of efforts to establish genuine, independent trade 
unions in China. The ICFfU has been a strong supporter of workers' 
rights in China, backing efforts to bring charges against the regime for 
violation of such rights at bodies like the ILO and providing resources to 
groups like the China Labour Bulletin and the Global Unions Liaison 
Office, both in Hong Kong. I03 While the ICFfU's official "China Policy" 
statement of November 2002 recognizes that there are different views on 
how to approach China within the international labor movement, it notes 
that "China violates human, religious and workers rights on a massive 
scale, including the central enabling rights of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining."I04 Further, in the face of these differences, the 
ICFfU concluded that the ACFfU "is not an independent trade union 
organization and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an authentic voice of 
Chinese workers." It thus "reaffirm[ ed] its request to all affiliates and 
Global Union Federations having contact with the Chinese authorities, 
including the ACFfU, to engage in critical dialogue ... includ[ing] raising 
101 Confusion at the ILO - China's Government Elected to Governing Body as . .. 
Worker Delegate, CHINA LAB. BULL., June 19, 2002. 
102 Id. 
103 ICFfU SURVEY supra note 55; ICFTU Denounces Prison Sentences on Worker 
Rights Activists, CHINA LAB. BULL., May 12, 2003; Press Release, Int'! Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions, ILO Keeps Pressure on Several Anti-Union Governments, 
(Apr. 4, 2003) available at http://www.icftu .. org/displaydocument.asp?Index= 
991217407; Press Release, Int'! Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU China 
Policy: ICFfU Executive Board, (Nov. 27-29, 2002) available at http://www.icftu.org/ 
displaydocument.asp?Index=991217172 [hereinafter ICFfU China Policy]. 
104 ICFTU China Policy, id. 
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violations of fundamental workers' and trade union rights in any such 
meetings, especially concerning detentions of trade union and labour 
rights activists."lo5 Such a position of "critical" dialogue appears to lie 
somewhere in the middle of the range of relationships now found within 
international labor, which include everything from "no contacts" to 
"constructive dialogue." The ICFfU defines "critical" dialogue as 
including "raising violations of fundamental workers' and trade union 
rights in any such meetings, especially concerning detention of trade 
union and labour rights activists."I06 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, some within the American labor 
movement, where a "no contacts" viewpoint has largely driven labor 
policy towards China, are now making an argument for a so-called 
constructive dialogue with the ACFfU that is precisely the kind of effort 
that so concerns the China Labour Bulletin about the possible "creeping 
legitimation" of that state body. Kent Wong, an American labor lawyer 
and former official of the Service Employees International Union and 
currently director of the UCLA Center for Labor Research and 
Education, Elaine Bernard, Executive Director of the Harvard 
University Trade Union Program and Gregory Mantsios of the Worker 
Education Center at Queens College of the City University of New York, 
have all recently advocated that the AFL-CIO should recognize the 
ACFfU.!07 
In the spring of 2002, Mantsios led a trip of U.S. academics and 
labor educators to China to meet with the ACFfU. He later issued a 
report calling for its recognition. lOS Despite the evidence presented 
consistently over the last decade by Han Dongfang and other human 
rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, Mantsios argued that the "ACFfU is an important advocate on 
behalf of [Chinese] workers. "109 A review of the report indicates that this 
delegation may have violated the ICFfU's official policy of critical 
dialogue with the ACFfU if and when such contact does take place, 
though admittedly that policy was only put in place after this particular 
trip. The Mantsios trip was undertaken "at the invitation" of the 
ACFfU and the delegation was "escorted throughout [their] trip" by the 
Deputy Head of the ACFfU's international department. llo Thus, there 
105 [d. (emphasis added). 
106 [d. 
107 Wong & Bernard, supra note 13; Leigh Jenkins, US unions resume talks after 20 
years, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 27, 2002; Gregory Mantsios, Tea for Two: 
Chinese and u.s. Labor: A Report from China, FalllWinter 2002, NEW LAB. F. 61 
[hereinafter Mantsios Report]. 
108 Mantsios Report, id. at 15. 
109 [d. at 7. 
110 [d. at 1. 
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should be some initial concern that the information presented to the 
delegation was filtered to favor the Chinese government and that 
delegation members were not free to engage in an open dialogue with 
any Chinese workers they may have encountered. Indeed, Mantsios 
admits that "[b]ecause the delegation was visiting China at the invitation 
of the ACITU, we did not meet with independent trade unionists, nor 
did we request to do so." The delegation "tried to compensate" for this 
deficit "by reviewing material written by independent activists." Of 
course, such material is widely available from organizations like the 
China Labour Bulletin, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
and would hardly justify a trip to China. 
Clearly the delegation had another goal. As Mantsios reports, "our 
purpose ... was twofold: 1) to improve mutual understanding of our 
respective labor movements, and 2) to explore ways in which relations 
between the Chinese and U.S. labor unions could be improved." Thus, 
from the outset, before the delegation even left the United States, it had 
already concluded that the ACITU constitutes a genuine labor 
movement. The trip, then, had a political goal, not a research or 
legitimate educational aim, despite having been organized by the 
university-based director of a worker education program and including in 
the delegation Kent Wong of UCLA, Elaine Bernard of Harvard, and 
Ruth Milkman, a UCLA sociology professor and Director of the newly 
established Institute of Labor and Employment at the University of 
California. 
The Mantsios Report ignores, sidesteps or outright contradicts what 
is widely known about the status of worker rights and the role of the 
ACFfU in China today. At one point, for example, it states that 
"China's international agreements as well as its domestic labor and trade 
union laws provide important rights and protections. Workers in China 
have the right to join a union, to elect and remove union leaders 
democratically, and to strike against an employer.'>111 The only source for 
these almost laughable conclusions is a reference to the recent 
ratification by China of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and a note that "other union rights are embedded in 
China's Trade Union Law, revised in 2001."112 
What do these laws actually indicate? Since the ACFfU exists to 
defend the interests of the state it cannot, of course, be called a genuine 
trade union and that is the conclusion reached by the ICFfU in its China 
Policy Statement promulgated in late 2002. By law, the ACFfU enjoys a 
legal monopoly;113 there are no legally protected union alternatives for 
111 Id. at 9. 
112 Id. at 17. 
113 See discussion supra note 58. 
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Chinese workers. Efforts to form alternatives to the ACFfU have been 
met consistently with the full force of state power. The Trade Union 
Law, instead of protecting the freedom of association, establishes a strict 
organizational hierarchy which requires each level of union organization 
in the country to submit to the will of the next higher level of 
organization, culminating in the ACFfU, "which shall be established as 
the unified national organization.,,114 
In fact, all of the sections of the Chinese labor organization are 
mandated to follow "the principle of democratic centralism," a hallmark 
of undemocratic Stalinist regimes.ll5 While the Law states that worker 
assemblies "shall have the right to remove or recall" 116 union 
representatives, the "trade union organization at a higher level shall 
exercise leadership over a trade union organization at a lower level. 'H17 
Further, new local unions can only be established with the "approval" of 
"the trade union organization at the next higher level.,,118 Finally, union 
financial resources are controlled jointly by the ACFfU and the Chinese 
state.119 Thus, the China Labour Bulletin concluded that "[i]ndependent 
trade unionists in China will find nothing to celebrate in [the new] 
legislation that guarantees the finances of an official trade union with a 
legal monopoly on organising. 'H2O 
The Trade Union Law does not contain any mention of the right to 
strike, and the explicit affirmation of this right once found in the Chinese 
constitution was deleted in 1982. As the ICFfU concluded in its 2003 
Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, "the right to strike 
was removed from China's Constitution in 1982 on the grounds that the 
political system in place had 'eradicated problems between the 
proletariat and enterprise owners."H21 In fact, according to one leading 
scholar of the Chinese labor movement, the elimination of the right to 
strike was a reaction by the regime to a wildcat strike wave that hit China 
in the wake of the emergence of Polish Solidarity in 1980 and 1981.122 
Instead, China's Labor Law only provides that "where a labour 
dispute ... takes place, the parties concerned may apply for mediation or 
114 See arts. 9-12, Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China (2001), 
Adopted at the 5th Session of the 7th National People's Congress on Apr. 3, 1992, 
amended in accordance with the Decision on Amending the Trade Union Law of the 
PRC made at the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9th National 
People's Congress on Oct. 27, 2001. 
115 See id. art. 9. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 See id. art. II. 
119 See id. art. 42-44. 
120 Analysis of the New Trade Union Law, supra note 7I. 
121 lCFIU SURVEY supra note 57. 
122 Labor Insurgency, supra note 79, at 49. 
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arbitration or take legal proceedings according to law, or may seek for a 
settlement through arbitration. "123 
It is true that the ICESCR does recognize both the right of 
individuals "to form trade unions and join the trade union of his 
choice ... [and] the right to strike."124 China ratified the ICESCR in 200l. 
However, the right to strike in the ICESCR is limited by a proviso which 
states that the right exists "provided that it is exercised in conformity 
with the laws of the particular country." Given the severe constraint on 
the right to strike in China in law and practice it seems unlikely that any 
worker can hope to take refuge in the ICESCR. Even if one could read 
the ICESCR to override the absence of the right to strike inside China, it 
is not a self-executing agreement and thus does not automatically 
become law inside China upon ratification but explicitly requires China 
"to take steps. . . including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant."125 Far from taking such 
steps, China appears to have moved away from its apparent commitment 
to genuine trade union freedom. Mantsios' sweeping conclusion that the 
right to strike actually exists in China by virtue of the ICESCR and the 
Trade Union Law is thus unwarranted. Further, upon joining the 
ICESCR, China issued a specific reservation, as it is allowed to do under 
international law, that "the application of Article 8.1 (a) [the right of 
workers to form trade unions and join unions of their own choice] of the 
Covenant to the People's Republic of China shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 
Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China and Labor Law of 
the People's Republic of China. 'H26 Thus, the monopoly of the ACFfU 
has been explicitly preserved. 
In the fall of 2002, following the release of the Mantsios Report, 
UCLA's Kent Wong also led a trip to China, bringing with him, among 
others, Andy Stern, the President of the Service Employees International 
Union, and Tom Rankin, President of the California Labor Federation. 
This group met only with ACFfU representatives, not with independent 
union activists. A report on the visit appeared in the South China 
Morning Post in which Kent Wong called for a "dialogue" with the 
ACFfU and argued that "reopening lines of communication" would 
123 Sec. 77, Ch. X, Labor Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted at the 
8th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on Jui. 
5, 1994, promulgated by Order No. 28 of the President of the People's Republic of 
China on Jui. 5, 1994, and effective as of Jan. 1, 1995. (Emphasis added.) 
124 ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 8. 
125 ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 2. 
126 Declarations and Reservations, International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Feb. 5, 2002, U.N. Treaty Collection (on file with author). 
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"better serve the interests of U.S. companies" investing in China.127 
These statements received a quick and sharp rebuke from Barbara 
Shailor, the director of the AFL-CIO's Department of International 
Affairs, who wrote a letter to the editor of the Morning Post stating that 
the Wong-led group was not an official AFL-CIO delegation and that the 
AFL-CIO shares the official view of the international labor movement 
that "the ACFfU is not an independent trade union but rather part of 
the Chinese government and party structure."128 
The viewpoint of Wong, Bernard and Mantsios has yet to gain wider 
traction in the American labor movement but it is symbolic of the 
intellectual problem that the current situation poses. A detailed analysis 
of the pitfalls of "constructive engagement" by organized labor with 
authoritarian regimes was undertaken by the International Union of 
Foodworkers, the official international body representing union 
organizations in the food industry, in 1997. An IUF Mission to Hong 
Kong and China, which did meet with many independent Chinese 
unionists, reached very different conclusions than these individuals. 
Consistent with the analysis presented here, which indeed relies in part 
on the work of the IUF Mission, the Mission noted that, first, "the 
ACFfU remains a subordinate organisation under tight party control, 
with no autonomy whatsoever"129 and therefore a "dialogue between the 
ICFfU (or any other democratic trade union organization, also at 
national level) and the ACFfU is not a dialogue between two trade 
union organisations but between a trade union organisation on the one 
hand and a state organization on the other.»130 Furthermore, the IUF 
Mission concluded that "[a]ll informed observers concur that there is no 
possibility of the ACFfU evolving into an independent organisation by 
itself. . .. [T]here would have to be serious division in the party and the 
emergence of a strong reformist-progressive tendency prevailing over the 
party conservatives ... it is certainly not visiting foreign trade unionists 
who will influence the outcome of such political struggles. "131 Given this 
likely stasis in the character of the ACFfU, the "China issue is too 
important and it [is] too complex to be handled by persons unprepared 
for the task. Participants in delegations have to take the time to be 
briefed in depth. . . . Chinese democratic trade unionists [including the 
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and Han Dongfang of the 
China Labour Bulletin] as well as NGOs with specific relevant expertise, 
should be involved in preparing any dialogue and in the discussions 
127 Jenkins, supra note 107. 
128 Barbara Shailor, Letter to the Editor, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (on file 
with author). 
129 IUF MISSION TO CHINA, supra note 68, at 29. 
130 Id. at 39. 
131 Id. at 30. 
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themselves."132 Finally, the Mission concluded that "[flull support, 
politically and financially, should be extended to Han Dongfang and 
other Chinese democratic trade unionists, by the ICFTU, ITSs 
(International Trade Union Secretariats) and national trade union 
organisations in a position to do SO.,,133 
Unfortunately, these core conclusions of a major international labor 
body appear to have been either readily ignored or violated by both the 
Mantsios and Wong delegations. In the face of widespread evidence they 
argued that the ACFTU is a genuine trade union and brushed aside the 
political situation in China today. They ignored Han Dongfang and 
consciously chose not to meet with dissident labor activists, while shaking 
the hands of those very individuals who are responsible for the 
repression of a genuine labor movement in China today. In light of the 
vigorous efforts of many thousands, if not millions, of Chinese workers 
such as Xiao Yunliang and Yao Fuxin to express their basic human rights 
to freedom of speech and association, it seems tragic that those in a 
position most capable of providing them support and encouragement at 
this crucial turning point in Chinese history willfully ignore them and, 
instead, present a distorted picture of Chinese reality to the outside 
world. An alternative view must be articulated if Chinese and western 
workers are to join together to reverse the "race to the bottom." 
132 [d. at 40. 
133 [d. at 42. 
